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ABSTRACT 
 
This study explores the extent to which decentralization has affected farmers’ access to 
agricultural advisory services in the Sunyani Municipality of Ghana. Specifically, it 
focuses on how political and organizational factors, which are intermediate outcomes of 
decentralization, affect the availability and relevance of advisory services. The study 
follows a qualitative research design employing qualitative methods of data construction. 
A total of 26 semi-structured interviews and 3 focus-group discussions with government 
officials and farmers were conducted in three farming communities in the study area.  
 
Using the soufflé theory of decentralization as a conceptual model for the data analysis, 
the results indicate that though there is some political commitment to decentralize, 
decentralization has not led to strengthened institutional capacity, effective stakeholder 
participation, accountability and adequate funding. This has made extension services 
almost unavailable in the study area. The study shows that decentralizing service delivery 
by itself cannot lead to improved access.  A careful mix of political and organizational 
ingredients is required for successful decentralization outcomes.  
 
 
Keywords: Access, Availability, Relevance, Institutional Capacity, Stakeholder 
Participation, Accountability, Funding, Agricultural Extension Agents, Department of 
Agriculture, Nkrankrom, Abesim, Kuffuor Camp.  
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1. Introduction  	  
In the 1980s, many researchers and academics advocated for decentralization in response 
to the revived global interest in governance and the necessity for human-focused 
approaches to development (Work, 2002). The widespread displeasure with overly 
centralized planning and administrative functions and the failure of centralized 
governments to create proper incentives to serve as catalysts for economic growth 
justified the need for decentralization (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Crook and Sverrisson, 
2001; Larson and Ribot, 2004; Lai and Cistulli, 2005; Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007). 
State failure was particularly illustrated by the poor performance of the agricultural sector 
in many developing countries (World Bank, 2000). In some countries, decentralization 
policies were implemented as a response to changing funding requirements of multilateral 
organizations and aid agencies (Cheema and Rondinelli, 2007).  
 
Consequently, over the last three decades, decentralization reforms have been pursued in 
many sub-Saharan African countries to improve governance efficiency and ensure that 
policies are more tailored to the needs of local people. The pursuit for decentralization is 
largely based on the proposition that local governments are closer to the people and 
therefore able to better appreciate local needs and preferences (Crook, 2003; Obeng-
Odoom, 2010; Cabral, 2011). A corollary to this notion is that decentralizing agricultural 
advisory/extension services delivery, for instance, will ensure that smallholder farmers 
have adequate access to information, skills and technologies to enhance their livelihoods 
and well being (Birner et al., 2006).  
 
In spite of decentralization’s promise of improved access, evidence on how 
decentralization affects farmers’ access to agricultural advisory services remains patchy 
(Birner and Resnick, 2010; Mogues and Omusu-Baah, 2014). Studies that have been 
conducted to assess the impact of decentralization have focused on the general themes of 
poverty reduction and local development performance, health and educational services 
(Adamolekun, 1999; Bossert and Beauvais, 2002; Crook, 2003; Faguet and Sánchez, 
2008). Those that have concentrated on agricultural extension services delivery have 
focused on the effects of decentralization on both public and private extension delivery 
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channels (for instance, Nambiro, et al., 2006; Mugunieri and Omiti, 2007), and 
emphasized the ‘here and now’, thereby failing to capture change processes.  
 
Using the Sunyani Municipality of Ghana as a case, this study contributes to existing 
knowledge on the effects of decentralization on farmers’ access to agricultural extension 
services. I have focused on public sector extension services delivery and drawn from the 
perspectives of both farmers and public agricultural extension agents using qualitative 
methods of data construction. The study also compares the situation before and after 
decentralization, thereby analysing a process of change.  Its primary focus is to 
understand how political and organizational factors in decentralized systems affect 
farmers’ access to extension services.  
 
In line with the aim of this study, the following research questions are explored:  
• What political and organizational factors have affected the delivery of extension 
services in a decentralized system?  
• To what extent have these factors affected the availability and relevance of 
agricultural advisory services in the study area? 
 
From a broader context, Ghana is interesting for this study because attempts at 
decentralizing agricultural advisory services in Ghana have been aimed primarily at 
enhancing public extension systems by assigning the responsibility of service provision to 
local governments instead of central government ministries or departments. This is quite 
different from other jurisdictions in Africa, for example in the case of Kenya, where the 
attention has been on decentralizing government’s role and shifting the responsibility for 
the delivery of extension services to other institutions (Mugunieri and Omiti, 2007). I 
have also chosen to focus on the Sunyani Municipality of Ghana due to the fact that 
agriculture constitutes the major source of livelihood to a majority of people (over 45.9 
per cent) in this municipality (SMA, 2012). Therefore the importance of agricultural 
advisory services for their activities cannot be overemphasized. Again, the municipality is 
‘home’ to people from diverse ethnic groups and backgrounds in Ghana. 
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Following this introduction, I have divided the study into six sections. The succeeding 
section provides a contextual and historical background to the study. In the third section, 
a survey of existing literature on decentralization and agricultural services is conducted. 
The fourth section presents the analytical framework, while the fifth section outlines the 
methodology, data construction methods and their limitations. In the penultimate section, 
I have discussed the results of the study. Some concluding thoughts are shared in the last 
chapter.  
2. Agricultural Advisory Services in Ghana: A Contextual and 
Historical Overview 
Ghana is a West African country with an estimated population of about 24,658,823 (GSS, 
2013). Agriculture (comprising forestry and fishing) remains the backbone of the 
Ghanaian economy, employing about 41.5 per cent of the economically active population 
aged above 15 years. The Ghana Statistical Service (2012) describes about 45.8 per cent 
of the country’s households as agricultural, with 95.1 per cent of such households 
engaged in crop farming, 40.5 per cent in livestock rearing, and 1.1 per cent into tree 
planting. About 0.2% of these agricultural households are into fish farming. In 2014, 
agriculture’s contribution to the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 21.4 per 
cent. Crop production is predominantly rain-fed and practised on small family farms, 
with majority of farmers still employing the use of rudimentary farming tools such as 
cutlass and hoe. This has in part resulted in average yields from farms remaining 
stagnant, with estimates indicating that average yields of most major crops are less than 
50 per cent of possible yields (Asuming-Brempong et al., 2006).  Asuming-Brempong et 
al. (2006) argue that the seeming slow pace of agricultural development in the country is 
also attributable to the fact that lots of farmers do not have access to effective extension 
services. Hence, a number of steps have been taken over the years to address challenges 
in the delivery of agricultural advisory services and to ensure that all farmers have access 
to extension services.  
 
Ghana employed an export-commodity development approach for developing agriculture 
before its independence from British colonial rule in 1957 (Okorley, 2007). Extension 
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services were targeted at supporting the production of cash crops such as cocoa, coffee 
and cotton for export to the neglect of food crop production which provided food and 
served as a major livelihood source for a majority of the rural population (Ntifo-Siaw and 
Agunga, 1994; Okorley, 2007). Thus access to extension services was largely limited to 
cash crop farmers. After independence (in the 1960s), the United Ghana Farmers’ 
Cooperative Council (UGFCC) provided extension services and their activities were 
complemented by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
through its “Focus and Concentrate” project. Under both systems, cash crop farmers were 
offered advisory services and farm inputs (Asuming-Brempong et al., 2006).  
 
Food security concerns were raised in Ghana after independence, especially in the 1970s. 
In 1978, the country consequently directed its attention from the promotion of cash crops 
to food crop production and adopted a Ministry-based general extension approach. This 
was done to modernise traditional farming practices through the application of improved 
agricultural technologies and to develop all areas of rural agricultural life (Okorley, 
2007). Under this approach, extension services were delivered to farmers through several 
independent departments such as crop, livestock, fisheries, agricultural engineering and 
veterinary services, under the Ministry of Food and Agriculture. The general extension 
approach was specifically aimed at developing agriculture in selected areas of the 
country; and it supported a limited number of ‘progressive’ farmers with inputs and 
technology, from whom other farmers were supposed to learn best farming practices 
(Amezah and Hesse, 2002; Okorley, 2007; Asuming-Brempong et al., 2006). Hence, 
likewise previous arrangements in the 1960s a majority of farmers did not have direct 
access to advisory services.  
 
In the early 1990s, the general extension approach was therefore highly criticized as 
being deficient and ineffective, top-down and pro-urban and was seen as favouring 
progressive farmers to the detriment of poorer farmers and women. The approach was 
also poorly managed since the different departments under the country’s Ministry of 
Food and Agriculture designed and implemented separate extension programmes that 
lacked coordination at the district level (Okorley, 2007). During this same time, similar 
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concerns were raised in other countries such as Togo, Burkina Faso and La Cote D’Ivoire 
and India, which practised a Ministry-based general extension approach. This prompted 
the World Bank to advocate for extension reforms in developing countries in the 1990s 
(ibid).  
 
In response to the World Bank’s calls, Ghana adopted a new nationwide agricultural 
extension approach called the Unified Extension System (UES) and the training and visit 
(T&V) extension management approach in 1992 (Amezah and Hesse, 2002). Under the 
UES-T&V approach, the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA) was re-organized and 
extension work was unified and put under one department, the Department of 
Agricultural Extension Services (DAES) at the national level. Again, only specific 
agricultural commodities that were considered to be important to rural and national 
development were targeted (Okorley, 2007). This intervention also aimed at fostering 
strong linkages between researchers, extension agents and farmers to facilitate the 
transfer and extensive use of proven agricultural technologies to meet the local needs of 
farmers. The World Bank financed the UES-T&V approach through a National 
Agricultural Extension Project (NAEP) between 1992 and 2000, and was placed under 
the then Ghana government’s policy framework called the Medium Term Agricultural 
Development Programme (MTADP) (MoFA, 2002; Okorley, 2007).  
 
An evaluation of the approach in the pilot regions revealed that it did not improve access 
to extension services. Much emphasis was placed on building the capacity of extension 
agents to transfer more agricultural technologies while less attention was given to 
farmers’ needs and what they actually required from the extension organisation (ibid). 
Notwithstanding the fact that most farmers became aware of improved agricultural 
technologies, farmers rarely adopted those strategies that required external inputs. Poor 
organizational management and implementation of the approach accounted for its poor 
performance (ibid). These necessitated the undertaking of further extension reforms by 
the Ministry of Food and Agriculture.  
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As a result of earlier extension approaches that had been adopted, the Ministry of Food 
and Agriculture (MoFA) had nine technical departments by the end of 1996.    These 
were the Departments of Crops, Livestock, Policy Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, 
Women in Agricultural Development and Veterinary Services (Amezah, and Hesse, 
2002). These departments were operating unilaterally and providing different extension 
services for farmers in each of the country’s 110 districts. The Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture at the national level controlled these departments at the national level, and 
extension officials were placed under the Directorate of Agricultural Extension Services 
(DAES). Extension programmes were planned based on the targets and standards 
specified by the MoFA at the national level (Okorley, 2007).  
 
In 1997, a decentralized agricultural extension services delivery approach was adopted to 
improve the effectiveness of extension services. The policy aimed at creating an 
environment that would promote self-help, local responsibilities and ownership of 
extension programmes. Hence, the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA) devolved 
powers to the district level offices to enable them design and implement their own 
extension activities, and within the framework of national agricultural development 
policy, manage their resources (MoFA, 2002). Further steps to decentralize the provision 
of agricultural advisory services have been undertaken since 2012.  
 
A summary of the approaches that have been employed prior to and after the country’s 
independence in 1957 to improve farmers’ access to extension services is provided in 
table 1: 
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Table 1: Summary of Extension Approaches and Policies to Improve Farmers’ Access in 
Ghana (Before 1957-2012). 
Source: Author  
 
Having provided the contextual and historical background of the study, I have presented 
definitions and discussed existing literature on agricultural advisory/services and 
decentralization in the next section.  
3. Agricultural Advisory Services and Decentralization: A Survey of the 
Literature  	  
The concepts of decentralization and agricultural extension services have evolved over 
time with several arguments put forward by authors to either justify their need or 
otherwise. This chapter defines these terms and provides an insight into the theoretical 
debates that border on agricultural advisory services and more especially decentralization. 
It also highlights theoretical arguments in favour of decentralized extension services 
delivery.  
 
 
Year Extension Approach  Limitations  
Prior to 1957-
1960 
Provision of extension services to cash 
crop farmers 
Neglect of food crop production. 
Access limited to cash crop 
farmers.  
1970s General Extension Approach  Limited to ‘Progressive 
Farmers’; Top-Down and 
Neglected poorer farmers and 
women. 
Early 1990s United Extension System and Training 
and Visit Approach 
Services not relevant to farmers’ 
needs; low rate of technology 
adoption.  
1997 Decentralized Agricultural Extension 
System  
 
2012 Strengthening decentralization. Local 
governments now responsible for 
service delivery 
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3.1 Agricultural Advisory/Extension Services 	  
From the traditional perspective of training farmers and disseminating technologies in the 
1980s and early 1990s, extension has more recently expanded to include helping farmers 
to form groups to deal with problems regarding the marketing of agricultural products 
and partner with a broad range of agricultural service providers (Birner et al., 2006). Thus 
Birner et al. (2006:2) define agricultural extension or advisory services as “the set of 
institutions that support and facilitate people engaged in agricultural production to solve 
problems and obtain information, skills and technologies to improve their livelihoods and 
well-being”. This connotes a service orientation, distinct from the traditional models of 
top-down technology transfer.  
 
Notwithstanding the broad range of agricultural services provided to farmers by extension 
officials, Anderson and Feder (2004) and Waddington et al. (2010) note that it is difficult 
to assess their impact on agricultural performance at the farm level since there are 
multiple factors that affect farm performance in complex ways. These factors may 
include climatic conditions, availability and prices of farm inputs, access to markets and 
farmers’ characteristics.  Some available evidence nonetheless points to a positive impact 
on farmers’ productivity and technological adoption (Birkhaeuser et al., 1991; Alston et 
al., 2000).  A more recent evaluation of the impact of agricultural extension services on 
grape production in Mendoza, Argentina by Cerdán-Infantes, et al. (2008) shows that in 
spite of insignificant treatment effect on yields, they had positive effects on productivity 
especially for those who recorded low yields prior to the implementation of the extension 
program. The research also shows increased quality of grapes particularly for large-scale 
producers. Owing to the importance of advisory services to farming activities, it is 
imperative that all farmers have access to extension services. Decentralizing extension 
services delivery is seen as the surest route to achieving this.  
3.2 The Promise of Decentralization  	  
Decentralization basically implies the transfer of planning and decision-making powers to 
lower bodies from a higher or central level of government (Rondinelli, 1981). Theoretical 
arguments in favor of decentralization are twofold: First, decentralization increases 
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administrative effectiveness and promotes managerial efficiency in the implementation of 
development programs and projects. Limitations of centrally controlled national planning 
are overcome through the delegation of greater authority to officials in the field. Officials 
of central ministries are relieved of repetitive tasks allowing them to effectively monitor 
project implementation (De Vries, 2000; Agrawal and Ribot, 1999). Second, 
decentralization brings government closer to local citizens both geographically and 
institutionally and hence ensures greater participation of people in development planning 
and management (Rondinelli and Nellis, 1986; Litvack and Seddon, 2000; World Bank, 
2000).  
 
As indicated in the introduction, attempts at decentralizing agricultural extension services 
have largely been inspired by the afore-mentioned advantages of decentralization. 
Advocates for a decentralized extension system argue that it reduces the role of 
government in agricultural extension, which has been culpable for inefficient service 
delivery thereby retarding agricultural growth (World Bank, 2000; Anderson and Feder, 
2004). Again, local people are able to exert control over local extension activities through 
active participation in program planning, implementation and monitoring. This ensures 
that extension programs are relevant to local needs. Moreover, decentralization helps 
improve managerial and technical capacity and enhances communication channels. It also 
contributes to safeguarding the financial sustainability of extension services delivery as 
local level officials can employ a variety of innovative means to increase revenue for 
public extension. This might include restructuring ways of staff recruitment and 
management, the provision of incentives and motivation and making prudent decisions to 
match revenues and expenses (World Bank, 2000; Swanson and Samy, 2004).  
 
One major study that has evaluated the impact of decentralization on extension services 
delivery shows some positive effects on farmers’ access to extension services in Kenya as 
farmers from areas with higher decentralized extension demonstrated high level of 
awareness of different channels for extension services delivery (Nambiro et al., 2006). 
Cohen and Lemma (2011) have also found similar results in Ethiopia.  
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In spite of the above advantages of decentralization some scholars have pointed out its 
limitations. Anderson and Feder (2004) posit that under decentralization there is the 
likelihood of political interference from the central government and extension staff may 
be used for other political activities such as electoral campaigns. The problem of financial 
sustainability might just be transferred to the local level instead of being solved. 
Additionally, decentralization may increase the spate of corruption since there will be a 
lot of people with some power to peddle, and these may hamper efficient service 
delivery. Corruption-avoiding strategies might increase cost and slow down program 
implementation. Subnational governments with larger revenue base can provide more 
local public services than those without such advantage. Again, inadequate local 
financial, administrative and managerial local capacity might lead to inefficiency, 
misappropriation and waste of public funds (Prud’homme, 1995; De Vries, 2000; Barrett 
et al., 2007; Okorley, 2007; Akramov and Asante, 2009; Manor, 2011).  
 
Notwithstanding the above counter arguments against decentralization it is noteworthy 
that arguments for decentralization only present the potential of the occurrence of 
positive outcomes. As noted by Rondinelli and Nellis (1986:19), they are usually “a priori 
rationalizations based on plausibility”, and the likelihood of success is contingent on a 
number of factors, which are inherent in decentralized systems (Manor, 1999).  
 
Andrew Parker in a 1995 policy research working paper for the World Bank titled 
‘Decentralization: the way forward for rural development?’ shares this view and suggests 
that like a soufflé that requires the right combination of ingredients and heat to make it 
rise, successful decentralization programs need the appropriate combination of political 
and institutional elements to improve development outcomes. He therefore provides a 
conceptual model based on a soufflé theory of decentralization to analyze the impact of 
decentralization on broader rural development outcomes (Parker 1995:43,45). Okorley 
(2007) in building an operational framework for improving decentralized extension 
systems, builds on the soufflé model and incorporates all the relevant elements for 
successful decentralization. This framework, discussed in the next chapter, has been 
modified to guide the data construction and analysis of this study.  
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4. A Conceptual Framework- The Soufflé ‘Theory’ of Decentralization 	  
In line with this study’s aim of examining the impact of decentralization on farmers 
access to extension services I have chosen to modify and use the soufflé theory of 
decentralization since it identifies and integrates the political and organizational factors 
required for the success of decentralized systems (Parker 1995; Okorley, 2007). These 
factors as pointed out in the preceding discussion determine successful decentralization 
outcomes such as improved access to extension services, which in the context of this 
study, encompasses availability and relevance to farmers’ needs (Shah, 1998; Ribot and 
Peluso, 2003; Peterman et al. 2010).    
 
As illustrated in the model in Figure 1, decentralization can succeed where there is a 
genuine political will by the central administration to transfer responsibilities for service 
delivery to local level governments and a clear legal framework to avoid overlapping of 
roles (Fig. 1). These political factors lead to organizational outcomes such as 
strengthened institutional capacity, stakeholder participation, accountability and adequate 
funding (Parker, 1995; World Bank, 2000; Smoke 2001; Okorley, 2007). Together both 
political and organizational factors impact farmers’ access to agricultural extension 
services.  
 
Thus in answering RQ1, I have examined the political and organizational outcomes in the 
current decentralized extension delivery system (as delineated in the model) and analysed 
their impact on availability and relevance of extension services in providing an answer to 
RQ2. I have elaborated on the political and organizational factors below the model.  
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Figure 1: A framework for analysing the impact of decentralization on farmers’ access to 
agricultural advisory services.  
Source: Modified from Parker (1995) and Okorley (2007).  
4.1 Key Elements for Success 
4.1.1 Political Factors  	  
Where central government officials are unwilling to cede powers due to the fear of losing 
certain privileges, decentralization efforts might fail. The central government must be 
willing to provide technical, administrative, logistical and financial support to field agents 
in the lower levels of government to ensure effective performance (Rondinelli et al., 
1989; Lai and Cistulli, 2005). In Indian states of West Bengal and Kerala, and in South 
Africa, Bolivia and Philippines, the success of decentralization was found to be largely 
dependent on the commitment of governments of these countries to empower local 
governments through the delegation of power and resources (Cabral, 2011).  
 
There must also be an unambiguous legal framework, which should stipulate how the 
various decentralized extension institutions must be organized, their roles and their 
relationships with other local and national organizations. This helps to prevent an overlap 
of roles (Parker, 1995; Rivera and Alex, 2004; Okorley, 2007). Both central and local 
government officials must also know the provisions of the legal framework in order to 
ensure compliance (Asuming-Brempong, et al. 2006).  
D
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4.1.2 Organizational Factors 	  
In order for extension organizations to provide services that are relevant to the needs of 
farmers, they must have the requisite technical and managerial capacity (Parker, 1995). 
Capacity refers to the ability to make informed decisions and attract and manage 
resources to achieve certain goals (Rondinelli et al., 1989). Thus insufficient funding for 
the delivery of extension services, inability to fully mobilize funds, failure to cost-
effectively deliver services and meet farmers’ needs are evidence of weak institutional 
capacity (Parker 1995). Several studies (Sharma, et al., 2001; Pasteur 2002; Saviroff and 
Lindarte, 2002; Tapa and Ojha, 2002) show that enhanced technical and management 
capacity helps improve the motivation, confidence and attitudes of extension staff.  
 
Extension staff must have adequate capacity and must be trained in technical agriculture 
to be able to assist farmers with improved crop varieties, planting techniques, efficient 
input use, market conditions, and more effective production management techniques 
(Anderson, 2007). Aside this they must be knowledgeable in communication and 
facilitating, problem-solving and critical thinking skills, teamwork and human relations in 
order to effectively interact with farmers and other stakeholders (Kroma, 2003; Kwarteng 
and Boateng, 2012). The capacity of extension staff could be built through staff training, 
informal learning, information and communication technology, research extension 
linkage and enhancing staff motivation and commitment. Career development 
opportunities, which enhance promotion prospects, also motivate staff to develop their 
skills and perform better (Vijayaragavan and Singh, 1997; Leeuwis and van den Ban, 
2004).    
 
Participation in the planning and implementation of extension programs by all 
stakeholders especially farmers ensures user ownership of programs, relevance to local 
needs, improves accountability, program effectiveness and strengthens farmers’ 
capabilities (Anthholt and Zijp, 1995; World Bank, 2000; Swanson and Samy, 2004; 
World Bank, 2004). Farmers can participate by being involved in the program 
development process such as identifying needs, setting and designing program goals and 
program implementation (Rivera, 2007). Where both public and private stakeholders such 
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as research institutions and commercial organizations (agricultural and food processors, 
input distributors and retailers) also participate in extension processes, diverse views, 
skills and resources become available to improve programme implementation and this 
strengthens networks for better service delivery and improved access (Leeuwis and van 
Den Ban, 2004).  
 
Conyers (1999) and Leeuwis and van Den Ban (2004) contend that it may not be possible 
for all stakeholders to be given decision-making powers and control over extension 
programs as a result of resource constraints, conflict management requirements and the 
need for leadership to ensure successful implementation of program objectives. There is 
also the concern that not all stakeholders might necessarily want to participate (Davis, 
1997). These concerns notwithstanding, Rivera (2007) argue that for the purpose of 
enhancing participatory processes, there is the need for a two-way communication 
between extension agents and farmers to ensure that extension delivery does not just 
become one of technology transfer but that which ultimately empowers farmers through 
knowledge. With such knowledge farmers will be able to hold extension organizations 
accountable and demand better services.  
 
There is the need for accountability; farmers who are users of extension services should 
be able to determine whether they are receiving services which are relevant to their needs 
or otherwise and should have the power to demand better services (Rivera, 2007). 
Accountability can be assured through administrative mechanisms such as the 
establishment of monitoring and evaluation systems for extension activities. Again, 
where private organizations and NGOs are also involved in extension activities, it brings 
about competition among service providers and services are therefore delivered 
efficiently, at low costs and extension agents become more accountable to their clients 
(Shah 1998; Cohen and Peterson, 1999; World Bank, 2000). 
 
Lastly, extension organizations require adequate funding to be able to organize staff 
training programs and embark on farmer outreach programs. Where there are little funds 
for recurrent costs and field operations, extension officers scale down field activities and 
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this affects the availability and quality of extension services (Bentz, 1997; Anderson and 
Feder, 2004). Local extension organizations can raise funds through the introduction of 
fee-for-service or cost-sharing arrangements, where farmers are made to pay all or part of 
the cost of services they receive from public extension units. They can also acquire 
additional resources by involving all stakeholders in extension program planning through 
partnerships and collaborations (Deshler, 1997 Anderson and Feder, 2004; Umali-
Deininger, 2007).  
 
Thus in summary, for decentralization to result in improved access to extension services 
there must be a clear legal framework and adequate institutional capacity for extension 
officers to deliver relevant services. Stakeholders must participate in planning, 
implementing and evaluating extension services through accountability mechanisms, and 
finally there must be adequate funding to ensure the sustainability of decentralized 
extension systems.  
 
The next chapter presents the methods of data construction of this study. 	  
5. Methodology 
5.1 Research Design 	  
The study follows a qualitative research design. A qualitative approach allows people to 
share their stories and provides a better understanding of the contexts and social settings 
that influence people’s behaviour. By interacting and commiserating with participants, 
the researcher is able to explore people’s views and complex phenomena including 
organizational and change processes and social interactions that influence outcomes 
(Patton, 2002). Since this study sought to capture change processes and identify the 
political and organizational factors that influence extension outcomes in a decentralized 
system, a qualitative approach was perfectly suited for it.  
5.2 Case Selection  	  
I chose a multiple case study approach in order to have a holistic understanding of the 
effects of decentralization on farmers’ access to extension services (Yin, 2003). Again, 
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some studies (for example, Nambiro et al., 2006) show that distance from cities and their 
social amenities influence access to extension services. Therefore, the three communities 
or cases (Abesim, Nkrankrom, Kuffuor Camp) under the Sunyani Municipality were 
selected to examine how distance, even in a decentralized system, affects farmers’ access 
to extension services.  
 
The Sunyani Municipality is one of the 22 administrative districts of the Brong-Ahafo 
Region of Ghana. Sunyani, which is its capital, also doubles as the capital of the region, 
and it is where all the regional and municipal level government departments and agencies 
are situated. It covers a total land area of about 829.3 square kilometres. The area’s high 
rainfall pattern coupled with its rich vegetation cover supports high agricultural 
production in the municipality. Farmers mostly cultivate crops such as plantain, cocoyam, 
maize and cassava.  Many farmers also cultivate pepper and tomatoes. Cocoa is the major 
tree crop and accounts for about 80% of cash crop earnings in the municipality. Oil palm 
and citrus follow in this regard (SMA, 2012; MoFA, 2015).  
 
Abesim is the closest town to Sunyani and the rapid growth of Sunyani has engulfed it. 
Majority of farmers in Abesim are vegetable growers. Nkrankrom is nearer to Abesim 
although connected by an untarred road. Kuffuor Camp is the farthest from these 
communities and Sunyani. It is a farming community with migrant farmers from all parts 
of Ghana. Fig 2 is a map of the Sunyani municipality. The study communities are 
indicated in capital letters.   
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Figure 2: Map of Sunyani Municipality, Ghana  
 
Adapted from Sakordie et al. (2014) 
5.3 Data Construction Processes 	  
Mikkelsen (2005) asserts that the selection of research methods must be guided primarily 
by the nature of the research questions to be answered. Given the research question under 
study, qualitative data construction methods were thought useful for this research. I used 
diverse qualitative methods such as semi-structured interviews, focus-group discussions 
and a review of existing literature and relevant documents such as legislations and policy 
documents on Ghana’s decentralization as they enhance the quality of case study research 
(Yin, 2003). Other organisational documents such as the extension policy and the 
‘reporting forms’ for extension agents also came in very handy.  
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5.3.1 Sampling  	  
An official of the Department of Agriculture in the Sunyani Municipality facilitated my 
entry into the field as a gatekeeper. Prior to the fieldwork in December 2014, we 
discussed the objectives of the research and possible criteria for the selection of cases and 
participants for the study. Creswell (2009) indicates that in a qualitative research the idea 
is to purposefully select participants that will help the researcher provide answers to the 
research questions. Accordingly, I used the purposive sampling technique, selecting 
participants mainly by “informational considerations” (Mikkelsen, 2005:193). Thus  
‘information-rich’ participants who have in-depth knowledge or had direct experience 
pertinent to the subject under study were sampled.  
 
Since, I was exploring the impact of decentralization on farmers’ access to advisory 
services, participants included government officials of the regional and municipal 
directorates of agriculture, officials of the municipal assembly (the local government 
office) and smallholder farmers in the study communities. To gain a better appreciation 
of the situation before and after decentralization, it was important to access officials who 
had been in the municipality before 2012 and were familiar with the processes of 
decentralization since 1997. Similarly, there was the need to select farmers who could 
share both experiences (before and after decentralization) on their access to advisory 
services. Smallholder farmers were further stratified on the basis of gender and literacy 
level, since these factors are also known to influence access to extension services 
(Nambiro, et al., 2006; Cohen and Lemma, 2011). Extension agents for all three 
communities were helpful in identifying participants and reaching them in the three 
communities. In some instances I also found myself using the snowball type of purposive 
sampling as some participants recommended that I spoke to other farmers in the 
communities or officials in the study DOA who could be of relevance to the study 
(Bryman, 2012). A list of participants of the study has been attached in Appendix 1. To 
safeguard the anonymity of participants, they have been identified with abstract names.  
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5.3.2 Interviews  	  
I conducted semi-structured interviews with officials of the municipal assembly and 
regional and municipal directorates of agriculture and with some smallholder farmers. 
The flexibility of semi-structured interviews afforded participants the leverage to decide 
on how to reply (Yin, 2003; Bryman, 2008). Again since I was doing a multiple case 
study, some structure was needed to facilitate easy comparison of cases (Bryman, 2012).  
Although I had an interview guide, it mainly served as a reminder on areas to be covered. 
My goal was to rely as much as possible on participants’ opinions; hence the questions 
were broad and open-ended to enable participants construct the meaning of the 
phenomenon being studied (Creswell, 2009). Initial interviews held with staff of the 
DOA helped me shape some of the questions for other participants.  In a few instances, I 
had to have interviews with some respondents again to corroborate certain facts that had 
been established. Such interviews, referred to as ‘focused interviews’ by Yin (2003:90, 
91) were conducted in an informal manner but in a quest to seek answers to specific 
questions.  
 
I conducted semi-structured interviews with 8 staff members of the Department of 
Agriculture (DOA), 2 staff members of the regional directorate of MOFA and 1 staff 
member of the Municipal Assembly. In Nkrankrom and Kuffuor Camp, there were 12 
interviews with both male and female farmers (six in each community) while in Abesim I 
had 2 interviews with male farmers and 1 with a female farmer. In all, I conducted 26 
semi-structured interviews. With the express consent of participants, each of these 
sessions was digitally recorded. I also took field notes to serve as back up to audio 
recordings.  
5.3.3 Focus-Group Discussions 	  
An FGD that included both male and female participants was undertaken in each of the 
three communities. Whereas it is recommended that focus groups should comprise a 
maximum of eight or nine people, to avoid complexities in data analysis (Mikkelsen, 
2005; Bryman, 2008), I could not control the number of participants, as passers-by joined 
the discussions as active participants. Participants were encouraged to freely express their 
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views notably divergent ones. This was necessary to establish the degree of consensus or 
divergence in opinions of the issues discussed (Morgan and Krueger, 1998). Again as was 
in the case of interviews, questions were broad to allow them decide on how to answer. 
Initially, I noticed that participants felt uncomfortable answering the questions as they 
thought they amounted to an appraisal of the work of extension staff, a practice that as the 
data will show was very uncommon in the municipality. I assured the participants of the 
aim of the study in order to alleviate the fear of a supposed backlash from extension staff. 
They were also made aware that they could decline participation at any point in time.  
5.4 Data Analysis  	  
Primary data from the field were coded in accordance with the types of themes and issues 
that emerged. The lists of codes were then organized under similar categories using my 
conceptual framework as a guide. I triangulated different data sources to ensure that 
themes were established on the basis of converging perspectives from participants.  This 
notwithstanding information that runs contrary to the converged themes has been 
presented knowing that in real life context there are bound to be conflicting opinions. 
Data has been presented mostly using participants’ quotes in varying length from long to 
short embedded passages (Creswell, 2009).  
5.5 Limitations and Quality Considerations 	  
Purposive sampling technique is highly susceptible to researcher bias as it is the sole 
responsibility of the researcher to make judgments on the reliability of participants. To 
avoid such bias, the cases and participants were sampled and stratified based on criteria 
informed by previous research and theory as discussed earlier (Tongco, 2007). Again 
since the study adopts a ‘before and after’ approach to analyse the impact of 
decentralization on farmers’ access to advisory services, I have depended mainly on the 
‘historical’ accounts of participants. As with all oral reports, such accounts are subject to 
problems of bias, poor recollection, and imprecise articulation (Yin, 2003). To safeguard 
the validity of data constructed I employed the iterative questioning technique, 
occasionally returning to issues previously raised by participants and obtaining related 
information by rephrasing the question. In this case it was easier to determine 
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contradictions. Moreover, I have triangulated data constructed with different sources, 
theory and previous research to establish congruence and examined the reasons for 
divergence in findings where there are such (Shenton, 2004; Tracy, 2010; Creswell, 
2013).  
6. Results and Analysis  	  
This chapter presents and discusses the results of the study. It is divided mainly into two 
sections, one for each research question. In the first section, I have sought to answer RQ1 
and discussed the factors that have impacted the extension system in the Sunyani 
Municipality, while in the second section which builds on the results of RQ1, I have 
examined the effects of these political and organizational factors on farmers’ access in 
answering research RQ2. Each section is structured according to the conceptual 
framework discussed earlier.  
6.1 Political and Organizational Factors 	  
Regarding political factors I have relied largely on the broader Ghanaian context, 
reviewing existing legislative and institutional framework to show whether there has been 
adequate political support for the decentralized extension system or otherwise. With the 
other organizational factors, I draw mainly from the perspectives of staff of the case 
extension organization (Sunyani Municipal Department of Agriculture), other 
government officials and farmers in the municipality to examine if and how 
decentralization has had a positive impact on institutional capacity, stakeholder 
participation, resource mobilization and accountability as promised by decentralization.   
6.1.1 Demonstration of Political Commitment and Support   	  
To prevent an overlap of roles between central government organizations and local 
government bodies responsible for the delivery of extension services, the literature as 
discussed earlier advocates for strong political commitment to decentralize and the 
enactment of a clear legal framework. Nie et al. (2002) show that the success of public 
extension reform in China is attributable to the promulgation of well-defined guidelines 
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(the passage of an extension law in 1993) by the central government, which gave 
authority to lower level bodies.  
 
In Ghana, I gathered from interviews with extension and local government officials in the 
Sunyani Municipality, existing legislative documents and some literature on 
decentralization in Ghana, that successive attempts have been made by both past and 
current governments to decentralize governance although fraught with a number of 
challenges (Mogues and Omusu-Baah, 2014; Asuming-Brempong et al., 2006; Interview 
with MDA1, 2014-12-16; Interview with MA1, 2014-12-16).  
 
Earlier attempts at decentralization began in 1988 where the then military government 
passed the PNDCL 207 to transfer administrative and fiscal power to the districts. This 
was among other things to facilitate rural development and to make governance less 
bureaucratic. Chapter 20 of the country’s constitution gave a further boost to the PNDCL 
207, which mandated the country’s parliament to pass laws for the implementation of 
decentralization (Constitution of Ghana, 1992), thereby indicating how powers, 
responsibilities and resources are to be transferred from central to local government units 
in a coordinated manner.  Thus for the purposes of local government, the country was 
divided into districts with the District1, Municipal or Metropolitan Assembly as the 
highest political authority in the district having deliberative, legislative and executive 
powers.   
 
An official of the Department of Agriculture in the municipality and a director at the 
Sunyani Municipal Assembly pointed out that it was in pursuant to Chapter 20 of the 
constitution, that parliament passed the Local Government Act 462, referred to as the 
‘Decentralization Law’ in 1993 (Interview with MA1, 2014-12-16). Section 161 of the 
Act provided for the establishment of a Local Government Service (LGS) whose 
members would be staff of the various district assemblies. It was however not until 2003 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 A district has a minimum population of 75,000 people; a municipality is a single compact 
settlement with a minimum of 95,000 people while a metropolis has a minimum of 250,000 
people (Local Government Act, 1993). These are all generically referred to as district assemblies 
or districts.     
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that the Local Government Service was instituted by the passage of the Local 
Government Service Act, Act 656. The LGS became operational in 2004. The Act also 
provided for the transfer of staff of the district assemblies from the Civil Service (CS) to 
the LGS. Consequently, government passed the Local Government Legislative 
Instrument (L.I.) 1961 in 2009 to reconstitute all departments of central government 
ministries and agencies at the district level into departments of the District Assemblies. 
MA1 (2014-12-16), a staff of the Municipal Assembly recalled in an interview that in 
2010, the government formed the Inter-Ministerial Coordination Committee for 
Decentralization (IMCCD), chaired by the President of Ghana, to oversee the 
implementation of the various laws that had been passed to accelerate the decentralization 
process.  
 
Therefore through the activities of the IMCCD, about 43,000 staff members of the Civil 
Service nationwide had been formally transferred to the LGS by the end of 2011. The 
central government departments in the districts were also finally reconstituted and 
merged into 16 departments at the Metropolitan Assembly level, 13 departments at the 
Municipal Assembly level, and 11 departments at the District Assembly level. These are 
all under the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD). The 
Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA) at the district level was one of the departments 
that was transferred and thus became a Department of Agriculture (DOA) under the local 
government structure. Once the transfer was made, it meant that the district assumed 
responsibility for the performance of their functions (Mogues and Omusu-Baah, 2014; 
Asuming-Brempong et al., 2006; Interviews with DOA1, 2014-12-10; MA1, 2014-12-
16). The LI 1961 also spells out the functions of each department of the assembly. For 
instance, the Department of Agriculture is, among other things responsible for the 
provision of extension services to farmers, and within the framework of national policies, 
assist in the formulation and implementation of agricultural policy for the municipality.   
 
Additionally, Section 38 of the Local Government Act 462, which envisaged the 
preparation of a “composite budget” at the district level, became operational with the 
passage of the LI 1961. Participants from the Department of Agriculture and the 
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Municipal Assembly recounted that as a consequence of this legislation since 2012 all 
departments of the District Assembly prepare their own budgets and integrate them into 
the overall budget of the District Assembly (Interviews with MA1 2014-12-16; DOA1, 
2014-12-10).  
 
Whereas the passage and implementation of various legislations demonstrate a 
commitment to decentralize governance and ensure enhanced access to public services, 
extension agents in the municipality indicated that they were not aware of the details of 
these legislations. AEAs 1, 2, and 3 recalled in interviews that prior to the changes in the 
organization of extension systems in the municipality, they received no education on the 
laws, their responsibilities and reporting and control channels (Interviews with AEA1, 
2014-12-11; AEA2, 2014-12-12; AEA3, 2014-12-12). They have therefore had to rely 
periodically on the director of the Department of Agriculture for insights into these 
legislations. Knowledge of the laws that border on decentralization and particularly those 
on the decentralized extension system is crucial in ensuring compliance and to guarantee 
improved extension services delivery as shown by Asuming-Brempong et al. (2006).  
Where the guidelines are unclear to extension agents, this may result in poor coordination 
between central and local level bodies and may smother extension reforms (Seepersad 
and Douglas, 2002). I have alluded to some of these effects in ensuing sections.  
 
It would suffice to deduce however here that the afore-mentioned efforts based on 
previous discussions in the conceptual framework, satisfies to some extent the necessary 
but not sufficient condition for political support for decentralized extension systems to 
ensure success, although the process has been slow and incremental. Other organizational 
factors that have altered extension systems in the municipality are discussed in 
subsequent sections.  
6.1.2 Is there Increased Institutional Capacity?   
   
Advocates for decentralized extension systems emphasize the fact that strengthened 
institutional capacity required to meet the demands of farmers is essential to ensure 
successful extension systems (Rondinelli and Nellis, 1986; Litvack and Seddon, 1999; 
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Kerr, 1999). They claim that while institutional capacity is an essential condition for 
successful decentralization, the process of decentralization in and of itself helps build 
capacity of local officials. In decentralized systems, central governments can pay 
attention to staff training while at the same time the ‘autonomy’ of local agencies will 
enable them devise innovative ways to ensure that their employees have adequate 
capacity (Kerr, 1999). Rondinelli et al. (1983) show that in countries like Indonesia, 
Morocco and Thailand, the capacity of local government bodies saw a modest increase 
within some years of implementing decentralization.  
 
I have examined these claims in the Sunyani Municipality by assessing the staff strength 
of the study Department of Agriculture and their technical and managerial capacity. In an 
interview with a senior staff member of the DOA, I was informed that the DOA had 28 
staff members: a director, 5 District Development Officers (DDOs), 10 Agricultural 
Extension Agents (AEAs), 2 accountants, 2 administrators, and 8 other support staff 
(DOA2, 2014-12-11). The AEAs are field officers and deal directly with farmers in the 
municipality. They are among other things, responsible for assisting farmers in 
diagnosing farm and farming related problems and advising them on solutions to such 
problems. They are also required to assist farmers with information on farm inputs, credit 
support and marketing to ensure cost-effective farming enterprise. The DOA has zoned 
the municipality into 20 operational areas for the purposes of delivering agricultural 
extension services. There are about 9 communities in each operational area with an AEA 
assigned to each area.   
 
An extension agent could count about 1,200 farmers in his operational area that he had to 
serve. Since there are fewer AEAs than operational areas, some staff members of the 
Department of Agriculture mentioned in interviews with them that there are some AEAs 
who had been assigned to more than one operational area (DOA1, 2014-12-10; DOA2, 
2014-12-11). Actually, the problem of inadequate staff has persisted and negatively 
affected extension services delivery by the DOA even prior to decentralization. 
Nonetheless, an official of the DOA mentioned that they are now constrained to recruit 
more AEAs:  
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Ideally, we should have at least one AEA in each of the operational areas. There is 
however an embargo on public sector recruitment. So we can only make replacements for 
retired, resigned or deceased staff members. –DOA2, 2014-12-11.  
 
Clearly such policy that limits the recruitment of people into the public sector may not be 
directly linked to decentralization. Nevertheless, this official also pointed out that the 
process of making and seeking approval for replacement of retired staff members under a 
decentralized system seems protracted and frustrating:  
 
Currently, requests for replacements are sent to the Municipal Assembly. The assembly 
then refers our request to the Brong Ahafo Regional Coordinating Council (RCC), who in 
turn submits it to the LGS. When approved the RCC issues appointment letters after 
seeking clearance from the MoF. It can take more than a year to complete this ‘cycle’. 
Hitherto (before decentralization) requests for recruitment were made directly to MOFA-
national. - DOA2, 2014-12-11.  
 
We have asked for the replacement of 3 retired staff members this year. We are yet to 
receive any response from the said quarters. - DOA2, 2014-12-11.  
 
Although some studies (Jütting et al., 2004; Okorley, 2007; Mogues and Omusu-Baah, 
2014) recognize the need to address the problem of inadequate staffing which remains a 
bane to decentralized extension systems in many developing countries, it is also crucial to 
lay emphasis on staff quality. Parker (1995) argues that the existence of a large number of 
extension personnel may only be indicative of the existence of capacity but does not 
guarantee it. Extension staff must therefore be trained to have adequate technical 
knowledge to help farmers identify and deal with farming challenges.  
 
In an interview with an official of the DOA he stated that all the AEAs in the DOA have 
a certificate or diploma in agriculture while 4 of the DDOs have bachelor’s degrees in 
agriculture or its related fields, with one having a master’s degree (DOA2, 2014-12-11). 
Diploma-level agricultural programmes in Ghana as in many developing countries only 
produce generalists in agriculture with limited or no training in any particular area of 
specialization. University degrees on the other hand are more specialized in major 
agricultural fields such as crop and soil science, agricultural economics and agricultural 
engineering, with little or no attention paid to agricultural leadership, rural development 
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and management skills (Zinnah et al., 1998; Swanson 2008; Spielman, et al., 2008; 
Kwarteng and Boateng, 2012).  
 
Due to the fact that there are lapses in extension education in the country, AEAs who deal 
directly with farmers must frequently be trained and their skills enhanced to enable them 
adequately address the changing needs of farmers. Prior to decentralization, DOA1 who 
is with the department of agriculture reported that they periodically assessed staff training 
needs through informal interactions with AEAs, monthly extension reports and from 
farmers’ complaints. Training sessions and workshops were constantly held by the central 
government’s Ministry of Food and Agriculture for extension staff (Interview with 
DOA1, 2014-12-10). Under the current decentralized system, staff of the study DOA 
shared the view that the frequency of such programmes has been reduced causing them to 
rely on previously acquired knowledge and skills, which may not be suitable for changing 
agricultural needs. This was expressed by AEAs in the following extracts:  
 
We used to have several workshops and training programmes on many agricultural 
development issues when we were under MOFA-national. If I recall, correctly, we used to 
have about 6 of them annually. For the past two years since we were brought under the 
MA, it was just in November this year that we had one workshop on agricultural value 
chain management. -AEA3, 2014-12-12.  
 
We have had just one workshop in the past 2 years. […] I have virtually been employing 
knowledge acquired over the years as an extension agent and from previous training 
sessions. –AEA4, 2014-12-12.  
 
Moreover, from monthly reports that AEAs submit to their superiors in the DOA, they 
are required to report on the number of trainings they had received. From a few reports 
that I was given by a staff member of the DOA, it was evident that since May 2012 till 
October 2014, AEAs had not received any training through workshops. Admittedly, 
‘supply-driven’ training programmes by central government agencies as argued by Kerr 
(2000) might not encourage local initiatives as such local processes by themselves also 
help build staff capacity. Kerr (2000) contends that staff capacity can be enhanced 
through practice and that local institutions must use a portion of their funds to solicit local 
technical experts to train staff. The local government can also give financial support to 
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the extension organizations to organize their own training programs. DOA1 and DOA2 
suggested that this has not been the case in the municipality as they are financially 
challenged to organize such workshops themselves and they receive no support from the 
Municipal Assembly in this regard. They have therefore resorted to informal learning 
where the District Development Officers (DDOs) of the DOA occasionally interact with 
the extension agents to share expertise (Interviews with DOA1, 2014-12-10; DA2, 2014-
12-11).  
 
Another way through which extension agents in decentralized systems can build their 
capacity is through enhanced research-extension linkage. Flow of appropriate 
technologies from diverse organizations including research institutions ensure that 
extension agents have ready access to knowledge required for their work (World Bank, 
2000, Rivera and Alex, 2004). Yet, in many developing countries research organizations 
are autonomous, operate under separate central government ministries from that of 
agriculture and have not been decentralized to the regional and district levels, thus 
hampering effective collaboration between them and extension organizations (Okorley, 
2007).   
 
This situation pertains in the study DOA as there are no research institutions in the region 
where the DOA operates. Still, there is a Research-Extension Linkage Committee 
(RELC) 2  in the region to foster collaboration among researchers and extension 
organizations. Annual meetings are organized to assess farmers’ adoption of technologies 
and to review research and extension programs and offer recommendations. As of the 
time the research was conducted a staff of the DOA indicated that no such meetings had 
been held in 2014 (Interview with DOA1, 2014-12-22).  
 
As pointed out earlier in the conceptual framework, the technical capacity of extension 
staff can also be built through ICT. Extension agents can use ICT to access professional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The RELC comprise researchers, the Regional Director of Agriculture, Regional Extension 
Officer, District Directors of Agriculture, Farmer representatives, NGOs and suppliers of inputs.  	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knowledge and other kinds of information beneficial to their work. ICT could be 
instrumental for the collection, analysis and storage of field data (Swanson and Samy, 
2004). Notwithstanding its importance extension agents in the municipality bemoaned the 
fact that they have no access to the use of computers and Internet services.  I was told in 
an interview with a senior staff of the DOA, that they had just 3 computers in the office, 
with one broken down. There was no Internet service in the DOA and staff members had 
to access this privately. Most of the DDOs had their own laptops (DOA2, 2014-12-11). 
The AEAs I interviewed also mentioned that they were not familiar with the use of such 
technology and would require some training for them to employ ICT for their work. They 
sometimes though use their private mobile phones in communicating with and delivering 
services to farmers (Interviews with AEA2, 2014-12-12; AEA3, 2014-12-12; AEA4, 
2014-12-12).  
 
Lastly, the literature suggests that when extension staff members are adequately 
motivated they are inspired to embark on activities to develop their skills in order to 
provide better services (Vijayaragavan and Singh, 1997). In the study DOA, however, 
AEAs lamented the fact that incentives such as staff promotions, provision of requisite 
logistics for their work and opportunities for career developments have been adversely 
affected since 2012 and by extension affecting staff motivation. Interviews with AEAs 
revealed that previously the central government’s Ministry of Food and Agriculture 
(MOFA) freely provided protective clothing such as wellington boots and staff uniforms, 
and subsidized prices for motorbikes to ensure that AEAs are able to purchase them and 
frequently visit their operational areas. The AEAs I interviewed indicated that these had 
not been forthcoming for the past two years (Interviews with AEA1, 2014-12-11; AEA2, 
2014-12-12; AEA3, 2014-12-12; AEA4, 2014-12-12). Staff members no longer received 
risk allowances, as was the case in the past. Delays in staff promotions were a major 
concern to many staff members of the DOA. DOA2 asserted that hitherto, requests for 
staff promotions were sent directly to the human resources office of MOFA, and were 
swiftly attended to. Currently such requests are sent through the Municipal Assembly, to 
the Regional Coordinating Council and to the Local Government Service Secretariat. 
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This lengthy process results in delays in handling such requests (Interview with DOA2, 
2014-12-11).  
 
Ultimately, the existence of adequate institutional capacity will be determined by the 
ability of staff of the DOA to effectively deliver extension services and meet the demands 
of farmers as discussed in the conceptual framework. Nevertheless, given that 
opportunities for building the capacity of extension staff in the DOA seems to have 
declined in a decentralized system, portends the fact that decentralization may not have 
led to increased institutional capacity in the study area as assumed by its advocates. A 
lack of support from the central government and the local government in organizing 
training activities, the bureaucracy that stifle prompt response to staff promotion requests 
and general staff welfare issues and the financial challenge faced by the DOA appears to 
have accounted for this.  
6.1.3 Stakeholder Participation: Declined or Improved?  	  
One of the main underlying assumptions of decentralized systems is that devolving the 
responsibility for planning and delivering services from the central government to lower 
level political and administrative bodies would spawn both informal and formal structures 
that can allow for increased participation (Manor, 2011). Empirical evidence with regards 
to whether decentralization leads to increased participation in development activities have 
provided mixed results (Crook, 2003; Faguet, 2004; Agrawal and Gupta, 2005). With 
regards to farmers’ participation in extension program development and implementation 
in particular, Cohen and Lemma (2011) report of a modest increase in farmers’ 
participation in some districts in Ethiopia as a result of decentralization reforms. A 
different story is told in the Sunyani municipality of Ghana.  
 
In an FGD in Kuffuor Camp, a male farmer recollected that the DOA previously invited 
him and another female farmer from the village to forums at the end of every year where 
farmers’ needs and problems in extension services delivery were discussed. Such forums 
were also avenues for them to participate in planning the implementation of extension 
services in the coming year (Farmer 1-Kuffuor Camp, 2014-12-22). In Abesim, another 
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male farmer corroborated this and recounted his participation in such events two years 
ago (Interview with Farmer 1-Abesim, 2014-12-22).  A staff of the DOA also mentioned 
that such forums were organized over a two-day period where farmers, opinion leaders, 
district assembly members interact with extension staff for the aforesaid purposes 
(Interview with DOA1, 2014-12-22). He noted they are unable to organize such events in 
recent times due to the lack of financial support from the central government. The 
Director of the DOA, DDOs and administrative staff of the DOA therefore rely on reports 
from extension agents who visit the field and are familiar with farmers’ challenges, to 
design extension strategies for the year (DOA1, 2014-12-22; DOA2, 2014-12-11; AEA1, 
2014-12-11).  
 
It is tenable to argue that the organization of these ‘stakeholder participation events’ in 
the past where only a few farmers could participate may not be cost-effective and may 
not amount to judicious use of limited funds. Thus as Cristóvão et al. (1997) has 
suggested there is the need for extension agents to build on and work with existing 
community organizations to solicit their knowledge and experiences for effective service 
delivery. Such indigenous organizations create the opportunity for ensuring broader 
farmer participation as a wider spectrum of farmers can be reached. In Nkrankrom, 
farmers pointed out that the only farmer group in the area was that for cocoa farmers 
(FGD with Nkrankrom farmers, 2014-12-19). In Abesim vegetable growers had through 
their own initiative formed an association for easy accessibility to credit and markets 
(FGD with Abesim farmers, 2014-12-22). There is a pepper growers’ association also in 
Kuffuor Camp (FGD with Kuffuor Camp farmers, 2014-12-22). The FGDs in all 
communities revealed that such groups have only become forums for extension agents to 
deliver their services to them rather than soliciting their inputs for extension program 
development.  
 
Regarding the participation of other stakeholders such as local NGOs, private or 
commercial organizations like agricultural and food processors and input suppliers, staff 
of the DOA indicated that they had not fostered any collaboration with such and thus they 
do not participate in extension program planning and implementation. An official of the 
	   38	  
DOA noted in an interview that there were no agricultural-based NGOs in the 
municipality. He also mentioned that reports from AEAs suggested that some private 
organizations were delivering extension services to farmers in the area but they had 
however not been in contact with these organizations (DOA1, 2014-12-10). The reason 
for this as explained by an official of the DOA is that:  
 
Writing to these private agencies, visiting their offices and inviting them over for 
meetings all require some expenditure and we do not have the funds for that-Interview 
with DOA1, 2014-12-10.  
 
Whereas this official cited the unavailability of funds as a reason for low stakeholder 
participation, there might be more to it that borders on institutional capacity. Facilitating 
stakeholder participation requires good networking, problem solving and human relation 
skills on the part of extension officers (Rondinelli, et al., 1983; Okorley, 2007; Swanson, 
2008; Swanson and Rajalathi, 2010). Ensuring stakeholder participation also calls for a 
change in the attitudes and behaviour of government officials to recognize the importance 
of shared decision-making and broader participation in planning, managing and executing 
extension activities. Such understanding and skills can be emphasized and acquired by 
extension staff through training (Rondinelli et al., 1983). As pointed out in the discussion 
on the subsection of institutional capacity, extension staff noted a virtual lack of training 
in these areas, with opportunities for staff training having declined under a decentralized 
system (Interviews with DOA1, 2014-12-10; AEA1, 2014-12-11; AEA2, 2014-12-12; 
AEA3, 2014-12-12; AEA4, 2014-12-12).  
 
Prior to 2012, stakeholder participation in extension programme planning was limited to a 
few farmers who were invited for stakeholder meetings in Sunyani, an anomaly 
decentralization was expected to correct. My inference from interviews and FGDs with 
both farmers and extension is that although existing avenues were not sufficient to foster 
stakeholder participation, they are not even present in a decentralized system. Other 
private and commercial organizations that were not engaged in extension development 
planning and implementation are still not involved in these activities, except delivering 
services to farmers on their own volition. Extension planning, development and 
	   39	  
implementation appears to remain top-down and it is possible to deduce that this is a 
consequence of low institutional capacity and unavailability of funds to organize 
stakeholder participation forums in a decentralized system. Indeed as Crook (2003:79) 
asserts, it is not even enough to encourage citizens or more specifically in this case, 
farmers’ voice; farmers’ voice must be heard and this is a question of accountability.  
6.1.4 Are AEAs now more accountable to farmers?  	  
Decentralization supposedly improves accountability mechanisms and allows the 
citizenry to demand better public services from state officials (Parker, 1995). Thus in a 
decentralized extension system farmers should be able to hold extension agents 
accountable to provide services that are relevant to their needs. Agrawal and Ribot (1999) 
suggest that where public officials are accountable to themselves or only to superior 
authorities in the governance structure (horizontal or vertical accountability), 
decentralized systems might fail.  
 
In the Sunyani municipality of Ghana, interviews with AEAs, other staff members of the 
DOA and the municipal assembly and with farmers revealed that accountability 
mechanisms largely remained only upwards or horizontal, with AEAs being accountable 
to their superior DDOs who are in turn accountable through the director of the DOA to 
the Municipal Coordinating Director, as illustrated in Appendix 5. Mechanisms for 
ensuring accountability are mainly administrative. DDO1 indicated in an interview that in 
order to monitor and evaluate the performance of AEAs, they are required to submit 
monthly reports to the District Development Officers (DDOs) who in turn compile them 
and submit an overall quarterly report to the municipal assembly through the director of 
the DOA (Interview with DDO1, 2014-12-09). In these reports AEAs must among other 
things account for extension activities they embarked on, technologies transferred and 
farmer groups formed. An evaluation of these reports provides the basis for adjudging the 
best AEA of the year during the annual Farmer Day Celebrations (DDO1, 2014-12-09).  
 
An official of the DOA also stated that although they are not required to submit this 
report to the Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture under this 
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decentralized system they send a copy of the report meant for the MA to regional 
directorate. This is to elicit technical backstopping where the need arises (DOA1, 2014-
12-10). This official also stated that technical review meetings are held quarterly in each 
year where the various departments under the municipal assembly meet to evaluate their 
respective reports.  
 
While this is a modest step towards ensuring that the DOA is accountable at least 
horizontally prior to and after decentralization, this is not enough. As Agrawal and Ribot 
(1999) have argued, downward accountability where service users can hold public service 
providers to be responsive to their needs is the basic dimension of decentralization and it 
is through that the acclaimed benefits of decentralization can be realized.  In the study 
area, there are no mechanisms for farmers to evaluate the activities of extension officers 
(FGD with Nkrankrom farmers, 2014-12-19; FGD with Abesim farmers, 2014-12-22). In 
spite of this some farmers who have been dissatisfied with the services of AEAs, had 
visited the office of the DOA to register their displeasure as the following interview 
extracts show:  
 
Some of the stubborn ones do come here to complain to our superiors especially when we 
do not visit their communities- Interview with AEA3, 2014-12-12.  
 
About three weeks ago, some farmers in a community where the annual Farmers’ Day 
celebration was to be held came to my office and claimed they did not know and had not 
seen their AEA in the community. The AEA was called to my office and the issue was 
resolved amicably-Interview with DOA1, 2014-12-22.  
 
Asked why although displeased with their services he had not taken steps to hold the 
AEAs or DOA accountable, a farmer in Nkrankrom retorted:  
How can I? I am just a village farmer and assuming I even muster the courage to go to 
their office, who will listen to me? -Farmer 4-Nkrankrom, 2014-12-19.  
 
I infer from the above quotes that they show the paternalistic and patronizing attitudes of 
local officials to farmers even in a decentralized system. As Rondienlli et al. (1983:78) 
observe such attitudes have long been fed and supported by centralized structures and 
procedures. Again they portray the fact that the planning and delivery of extension 
services involve a number of actors who have unequal powers and that there are local 
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social inequalities that prevent farmers from holding extension agents accountable. 
Supporters of decentralization tend to ignore these power relations (Meynen and 
Doornbos, 2004) and assume that decentralization will lead to downward accountability. 
The reverse looks to be the case in the study area. With the seeming absence of a 
multiplicity of other organizations that provide extension to foster competition and make 
AEAs more accountable to their clients as suggested by the literature, only administrative 
mechanisms are used to ensure this, and farmers practically have no roles to play.  
 
This result is consistent with that of Cohen and Lemma (2011) in four districts of four 
different regional states in Ethiopia. Accountability of extension officials was found to 
remain mostly upward after decentralization reforms, as the administrative and political 
systems were still very hierarchical.  
6.1.5 Is Funding Available for Extension Services?  	  
Lack of funds is often cited as one of the factors that impede the availability of extension 
services to farmers. There must be funds to cover administrative or recurrent and capital 
expenditure of extension organizations to ensure that AEAs have the required logistics 
for field activities (Swanson and Samy, 2004; Okorley, 2007). In decentralised systems 
‘independent’ local government bodies can devise innovative ways to safeguard the 
financial sustainability of its departments (Swanson and Samy, 2004; Anderson and 
Feder, 2004). Indeed this was the expectation of government officials of the municipality 
as expressed by an official of the Regional Directorate of MOFA: 
 
We expected that with decentralization the DOA would have four sources of funds: the 
central government, the municipal assembly, MOFA and NGOs or CSOs-Interview with 
RD1, 2014-12-16.  
 
The study DOA still relies on the central government to fund its activities. Central 
government provides funding for the DOA’s expenditure on goods and services. These 
refer to administrative expenditures such as stationery and transportation incurred in 
executing the department’s main responsibilities of extension delivery. These funds are 
supposed to be released quarterly each year, coming in at the beginning of each quarter. 
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These have however not been forthcoming since 2012 as indicated by participants in the 
municipal assembly and the DOA. For the past two years, an official of the DOA 
recounted that funds are only released in October and November. At the time this study 
was being undertaken in December 2014, the DOA had just received partial funds for 
June to December for 2013. This differed strikingly from the situation prior to 2012:  
 
Previously we were assured of regular inflows from MOFA. In instances were funds were 
delayed, the Ministry gave us reasons. We were sometimes also given a provisional sum 
that was usually below what we had budgeted for the first quarter. When the MoF finally 
approves the budget, we received a top-up for the first quarter, together with funds for 
the 2nd quarter, while that of the 3rd and last quarters followed subsequently. - DOA1, 
2014-12-22.  
 
Mogues and Omusu-Baah (2014) found similar results in a recent scoping study in the Ga 
West Municipal Assemby and the Shai-Osodoku District Assembly of Ghana. In 2012, 
these two case study DOAs received only two releases for goods and services. The 
Dangbe East DOA in the Greater Accra Region of Ghana also received two financial 
releases of these funds instead of the quarterly four releases. The first release was made 
as late as September 2012 and the second in December 2012. As of July 2013, neither of 
these districts had received funds for goods and services (Mogues and Omusu-Baah, 
2014:8).  
 
Not only are funds released late, they also fall short of the budgeted funds of the DOA. 
For the Sunyani Municipal DOA, a staff member recalled that that they were made to 
prepare a budget within a GH¢28,000 ceiling for 2013. The DOA however received only 
GH¢16,000. For 2014, they had only received less than a quarter (GH¢ 8,000) of the GH¢ 
35,000 budgeted for (DOA1, 2014-12-22). This is similar to the Ga West DOA, where 
releases for goods and services, which amounted to about GH¢ 40,000 per annum before 
2012 was cut by 40 per cent in 2012 (Mogues and Omusu-Baah, 2014:8).  
Budgetary inadequacy and delays have been attributed to central government’s inability 
to meet the budgetary needs of its ministries and departments as expressed in the words 
of an official of the Sunyani Municipal Assembly:  
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[…] Government has not been able to meet its financial obligations, and that is why we 
have these challenges. Even for us at the Municipal Assembly, it was just about two 
weeks ago that we received our share of the first quarter of the Common Fund3. Maybe 
this is because of the increase in public wages […]. Government is unable to meet the 
budgetary demands of its departments - MA1, 2014-12-16.  
 
The above extract clearly shows that the problem of delays in the release of funds is not 
peculiar to the DOA, and in the absence of official reasons, some speculative 
explanations have been given. Mogues and Omusu-Baah (2014) for instance also 
speculate that the high wage bill which is a result of central government’s upward 
adjustment of public wages through a new personnel policy implemented in 2011, 
account for Ghana’s current fiscal challenges, and hence government’s inability to 
promptly release adequate funds for the DOA.  
 
Other reasons such as the long-winded administrative mechanisms used to check 
expenditure and corruption by the Municipal Assembly, the apparent bureaucratic 
structure of the assembly and staff attitudes account for delays in disbursing funds to the 
DOA even after the MoF has released them. An official of the Department of Agriculture 
assembly explained that before decentralization funds were released directly to them from 
the central government’s Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA). They could 
therefore access the funds within a week. Currently funds are released from the Ministry 
of Finance (MoF) to the Municipal Assembly and it could take between one to three 
months before they are able to access the funds. He noted that sometimes officials of the 
Municipal Assembly who should work on the requests are absent from work either for 
official or personal reasons, hence the delay (DA1, 2014-12-10). He recounted several 
occasions where he had had to visit the offices of officials at the municipal assembly to 
ensure that they promptly work on their requests.  
For another official of the Municipal Assembly the delay was as a result of the necessary 
checks conducted to ensure that funds were not mismanaged. When funds are released 
from the central government, the budget officer at the Assembly has to verify the requests 
of the DOA to determine whether they are covered in the earlier budget prepared. When 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 A minimum of 7.5% of national revenue set aside and shared among all District Assemblies in 
Ghana.  
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this is done, the Municipal Coordinating Director then gives instructions for pre-auditing. 
The MCD then forwards the request to the Municipal Chief Executive who subsequently 
approves for a cheque to be released by the Finance Officer of the Assembly to the DOA 
(MA1, 2014-12-16).   
 
Prud’homme (1995) and Okorley (2007) have argued that corruption-avoiding strategies 
such as the pre-auditing and post-expenditure auditing mechanisms delay the 
implementation of programs in decentralized systems. Moreover, as discussed earlier, 
decentralizing governance without appropriate behavioural and attitudinal change among 
lower level government officials to support the decentralization of service delivery and 
maintenance will undermine extension systems (Rondinelli, 1989; Shah, 1998).  
 
While central government funding has been unavailable, the municipal assembly is also 
unable to support the DOA financially from its internally generated funds (IGFs). An 
official of the MA mentioned that they do not generate enough funds from the 
municipality and these meagre funds are used on development projects in the area (MA1, 
2014-12-16). He further stated that where they have to prioritize among departments or 
projects to support “education and health usually come first, before agriculture” (MA1, 
2014-12-16). Again, current central government extension policy considers extension 
service as a public good, thus services are provided freely and no attempts have been to 
revise this policy to allow for fee-for-service arrangements (DOA2, 2014-12-12; DOA1, 
2014-12-22; MOFA, 2002). It is only MOFA’s Veterinary Services Directorate that has 
commercialized some of its services (MOFA, 2003).  
 
The current financial challenges the DOA faces lends credence to Anderson and Feder’s 
(2004) claim that in some decentralized systems, fiscal challenges instead of being 
resolved are only transferred to the local level. Given that the fiscal sustainability of the 
DOA has been undermined or if I dare say worsened under this current system, it is not 
surprising that participants constantly made reference to it in earlier discussions on 
institutional capacity and stakeholder participation.  
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After examining the intermediate outcomes of decentralization, the next question that 
begs resolution is to what extent then have they affected farmers’ access to extension 
services? This therefore takes us to the next subsection.  
6.2 Impact on Farmers’ Access to Extension Services 	  
This section seeks to answer RQ2: to what extent have these political and organizational 
factors affected the availability and relevance of advisory services in the study area? 
Although this section is the crux of this study, it is not elaborate in terms of length as 
compared to the other section as it deals with only two aspects of access: availability and 
relevance of extension services before and after decentralization. The section draws 
mostly from the perspectives of farmers in the three study communities.  
6.2.1 Availability and Relevance 	  
Farmer 1-Nkrankrom is a thirty-six year old female smallholder who cultivates a variety 
of crops. She is a second wife to another farmer in Nkrankrom whom she had worked 
with on the same farms together with the first wife. During these times, they had ready 
access to extension services as the then extension agent often frequented their farms, 
albeit the husband was largely the recipient of such services (Farmer 1-Nkrankrom, 2014-
12-19).  She informed me in an interview that for the past two years she decided to 
cultivate her own farm as she felt she did not “receive much benefits from her toil on 
their ‘family’ farm”. She asserted that due to this her husband who mostly interacted with 
the extension agent had refused to share with her information on appropriate farming 
practices and technology. She had also not received frequent visits from the new AEA 
who was posted to their operational area two years ago.  
Farmer 1’s (Nkrankrom) story highlights some of the challenges with regards to the 
availability of extension services in the previous and current extension systems and the 
methods used for extension delivery. Indeed in Nkrankrom, Farmer 1 was not the only 
one who was not enthused about the services of the current AEA. Both male and female 
participants of the FGD and interviews were full of praise for the previous extension 
agents as they indicated that they visited the community and their farms regularly; the 
same however could not be said of the new one (FGD with Nkrankrom farmers, 2014-12-
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19). Participants reported that she barely visited the community and when she did she 
only visited farms that were easily accessible. They received extension services from no 
other organization and have had to rely on each other or on more experienced farmers for 
information on farming activities (FGD with Nkrankrom farmers, 2014-12-19). Given the 
patriarchal nature of many Ghanaian societies and the fact that the previous AEAs had 
been males, some farmers cited her gender as reason for her unavailability claiming that 
men were better AEAs. This is shown in the following interview extracts:  
We have not had access to extension services as we used to because of the AEA we have 
here. She is a woman and very inactive as compared to Mr. A (past AEA). Mr. A was with 
us almost every day. For the extension work it is the men who can do it effectively as it 
involves travelling long distances to visit farms. We prefer men as AEAs because they are 
very energetic-Farmer 1 in an FGD with Nkrankrom Farmers, 2014-12-19.  
For another farmer it boiled down to her poor attitude towards work:  
People work differently, and I think this may not have anything to do with her gender. 
Some people are hardworking, others are not and for me this AEA appears to be one of 
those who are not- Interview with Farmer 2, Nkrankrom- 2014-12-19.  
Both in earlier discussions on organizational factors and the present one that deals with 
access and relevance, one theme that runs through is the attitudes of local government 
officials and that of AEAs of the DOA that influence extension services delivery.  Yet, 
this is not given much attention in the literature. Perhaps as Rondinelli et al. (1983:57) 
have reasoned, this is due to the fact that attitudes are “soft variables”. It is quite difficult 
to operationalize them or deal with them in a policy sense. Nonetheless, as earlier 
discussions on institutional capacity in the conceptual framework and previous analysis 
show, attitudes could be altered to some extent, through staff training and motivation. 
Under this current decentralized system avenues for staff training and motivation have 
however been negatively affected as previously shown.  
In spite of the fact that extension services were not readily available, participants in 
Nkrankrom indicated that the few times they interacted with the AEA, issues discussed 
were germane to their farming needs (FGD with Nkrankrom Farmers, 2014-12-19). Prior 
to such meetings, the AEA reaches one of the farmers on phone who in turn announces to 
the rest of the farmers that the AEA will be visiting the community. The problem with 
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such community meetings as participants identified was that that not all farmers are made 
aware of her visit and therefore are unable to be present to benefit from the AEA’s 
services (FGD with Nkrankrom Farmers, 2014-12-19). Again as Cristóvão et al. (1997) 
warns extension organizations must not assume that beneficiary farmers are a 
homogeneous group. Identification of specific groups based on size of land holdings and 
other socio-economic factors is crucial in extension services delivery as needs and 
preferences of farmers may differ. This is not done in this study area (FGD with 
Nkrankrom Farmers, 2014-12-19; Interviews with Farmer 3-Nkrankrom, 2014-12-19; 
Farmer 4, 2014-12-19).  
The situation is not different from that of Abesim where farmers have been unhappy with 
the services of both past and present AEAs. In an FGD, the farmers claimed they have 
not had adequate access to extension services before and even after decentralization. 
They however mentioned that previously, they were receiving some farming inputs from 
the DOA but had not received such for the past two years (FGD with Abesim farmers, 
2014-12-22). The vegetable farmers were very critical of the DOA and its personnel 
noting that they did not visit their farms and even when they visited the community they 
preferred to visit nearby farms as the quote below from Farmer 1-Abesim show:  
I had problems with some diseases on my maize farm some time ago. I called him on 
phone and he asked me to show him where the farm is. After giving him directions to the 
farm and having recognized the area, he sharply responded that the farm was too far and 
he cannot make it. You (referring to the AEA) are just visiting the farm once in about six 
months and you are telling me it is far, how about I who travels that distance every day? - 
Interview with Farmer 1-Abesim, 2014-12-22.  
One of the participants in the FGD recalled that four years ago, when they formed a 
group and ‘contracted’ the then AEA to be providing extension services to them at their 
expense, he failed to perform his side of the bargain (FGD with Abesim farmers, 2014-
12-22). Participants of the FGD also cited instances where information provided on the 
use of some farm inputs by extension agents had rather caused harm to their farms; in 
other instances, they have not been able to prescribe solutions to some crop diseases 
(Farmer 2, FGD with Abesim Farmers, 2014-12-22). Participants were therefore doubtful 
of the competence of the AEA.  
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A few weeks ago, I called him on a challenge I had on my pepper farm. Without visiting 
the farm to diagnose the nature and extent of the problem, he recommended that I should 
go and buy some of the chemicals we usually buy and it will be fine. A colleague farmer 
however suggested a technique to me, which was useful and did not require that I bought 
any chemicals- Farmer 3, FGD with Abesim Farmers, 2014-12-22.    
On the issue of farm chemicals to treat crop pests and diseases, participants mentioned 
that due to the proliferation of such on the market, they are unable to tell which was 
useful and that which was counterfeit. Moreover, they lacked adequate knowledge on the 
appropriate application of farm inputs. The AEA had not been helpful in providing advice 
in these areas, the farmers intimated (FGD with Abesim Farmers, 2014-12-22).  
Furthermore, the vegetable farmers mentioned that they encountered difficulties in 
marketing their produce, an issue of particular importance to their activities and yet the 
AEA has failed to assist them. Consequently, they have recently organized themselves 
into an FBO in order to have ready access to market information and a strong bargaining 
power on the market (FGD with Abesim Farmers, 2014-12-22). Owing to the fact that 
this is a budding group, there is the need for AEAs to assist in building their capacity and 
training them in management and accounting skills (Birner and Anderson, 2007; Holmén, 
2011). A leader of the group who was also a participant of the FGD indicated that the 
AEA had promised to organize such training sessions for them but this is yet to 
materialize (Farmer 4, FGD with Abesim Farmers, 2014-12-22).  
Actually, AEAs are required to assist farmers in confronting marketing challenges as the 
country’s extension policy document show (MOFA, 2003). Hence they are encouraged to 
facilitate the formation and development of farmer groups in order to realize this. In their 
monthly reports, they are obliged to account for the number of groups formed in their 
operational areas. A look at some of the reports that I was given by staff of the DOA 
showed that from May 2012, most AEAs have not delivered in this regard.   
For farmers in Abesim, advisory services were not readily available because of AEAs’ 
dereliction of their duties, a lack of appreciation on the part of AEAs of their farming 
challenges and inadequate technical capacity to help them resolve them (FGD with 
Abesim Farmers, 2014-12-22).  
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The AEAs had earlier stated in my interviews with them that they were unable to perform 
their duties as required, except that they had different reasons as the following interview 
extracts show:  
I am supposed to serve about 1,200 farmers in 15 communities in my operational area 
[…] It was just about a week ago that I was informed that last year’s money for 
transportation has been released. How do I visit my farmers with no money for 
transportation? We are not given motorbikes and with the one I personally bought I 
receive no money to buy fuel. There is no risk allowance, no uniforms are provided, we 
have to sometimes buy fuel, and even field note books ourselves and hope to be 
reimbursed later-Interview with AEA3, 2014-12-12.  
Ideally we should be able to conduct several field demonstrations and farmer exchange 
visits within a year. The farmers expect we the AEAs to bear their transport costs when 
farmer exchange visits are organized and considering that our funds are not promptly 
released I am unable to organize such visits- Interview with AEA2, 2014-12-12. 
The above quotes show that for the AEAs their inability to provide advisory services to 
farmers bordered more on the lack of logistics and a lack of motivation, reiterating earlier 
discussions on institutional capacity and funding.  Be that as it may, poor work attitudes, 
inadequate logistics for extension services and a lack of motivation, as noted in earlier 
discussions, are a reflection of broader institutional and organizational lapses that impede 
the successful delivery of extension services, even in decentralized systems (Rondinelli et 
al., 1983). 
To ensure that they provide their services to farmers in spite of these challenges, staff of 
the DOA told me that they had employed the use of technology to reach more farmers. 
They asserted that some farmers in the communities have their contact numbers and 
reached them on phones when the need arises (AEA1, 2014-12-11 AEA2, 2014-12-12; 
AEA3, 2014-12-12; AEA4, 2014-12-12). Some radio stations have also been benevolent 
to the DOA having given them free airtime once a week to sensitize farmers on 
agricultural issues (DOA1, 2014-12-22). Again, since they are unable to visit individual 
farms, AEAs mostly organize community meetings to disseminate agricultural 
information (AEA1, 2014-12-11 AEA2, 2014-12-12).  
In Kuffuor Camp, which is relatively farther away from Sunyani, the story was different; 
most farmers I interviewed and participants of the FGD were satisfied with both past and 
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present AEAs and claimed they had ready access to extension services. Farmers indicated 
that the present AEA in particular visited the community regularly and visits individual 
farms (FGD, 2014-12-22). Two farmers had high regard for the current AEA, noting that 
it was through his timely advice to them that they won awards as male and female best 
pepper farmers for 2014 for the Sunyani municipality (Interviews with Farmer 1 and 
Farmer 2-Kuffuor Camp, 2014-12-22). Farmers however also mentioned the need for 
more assistance in dealing with marketing challenges (FGD, 2014-12-22).  
Later I gathered that this AEA was a District Development Officer (DDO) with a 
master’s level education in agriculture. He had been assigned to this community due to 
the fact that there were not many AEAs for the DOA (DOA1, 2014-12-22). This DDO 
(and AEA) mentioned in an interview that with his background in the study of the causes 
of diseases in plants and how to manage them he felt obliged to share his expertise and be 
as useful as possible to the farmers in this community, in spite of the lack of logistical 
support (DDO2, 2014-12-23). Indeed it may be far-fetched to suggest that enhanced 
technical capacity leads to better work ethic as implied by this DDO. Nonetheless, in 
Venezuela, Saviroff and Lindarte (2002) show that training helped motivate extension 
staff to deliver better services. It is therefore plausible to inconclusively infer that farmers 
in Kuffuor Camp had better access to extension services due to their AEA’s training. The 
case of Kuffuor Camp also illustrates the significance of enhanced institutional capacity 
in ensuring better access to extension services as discussed in the conceptual framework.  
This result in Kuffuor Camp differs from that of Nambiro et al. (2006) who show that 
distance from towns significantly influenced farmers’ access to extension services even in 
a decentralized system. Farmers in Kuffuor Camp, which is farther away from the office 
of the DOA relatively access better extension services than others in Nkrankrom and 
Abesim.  
In the context of this study, decentralization should result in the final outcome of 
improved access to extension services by farmers. Inadequate institutional capacity 
exemplified by a lack of sufficient logistical support for AEAs to carry out their duties 
low technical capacity, low staff motivation, poor staff attitudes, and inadequate funding, 
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have made extension services almost unavailable to farmers in Nkrankrom and Abesim. 
The case of Kuffuor Camp is however different, illustrating the importance of staff 
training to the availability and relevance of extension services.   
7. Conclusion  	  
In this study, I have sought to contribute to an unresolved debate on the impact of 
decentralization on public services delivery. Whereas considerable attention has been 
paid to its impact on other services such as education and health, little is known about 
decentralization’s effect on extension services. I have therefore examined the effects of 
decentralization on farmers’ access to extension services by assessing political and 
organizational factors regarded as immediate outcomes of decentralization.  
On political factors, the study has shown that there has been a relatively strong political 
commitment to decentralize service delivery and ensure improved access. This has been 
done through the promulgation of several laws and policies since 1988, with the country 
taking further steps in 2012 to consolidate decentralization. AEAs are however oblivious 
of the provisions of these legislations thereby affecting compliance.  
While there is demonstrable political commitment, organizational factors appear to be 
adversely affected. Opportunities for enhancing institutional capacity seem to have waned 
since 2012. Since the DOA is not an income generating organization, they are unable to 
organize such sessions on their own. The Municipal Assembly faced with its own 
peculiar challenges is also unable to provide any support in this regard. Staff motivation 
and general welfare issues are not promptly attended to, as the processes are currently 
long-winded than they used to be under a centralized system. The planning, development 
and implementation of extension programs remain top-down and farmers and other 
stakeholders are not involved. Mechanisms for ensuring farmer participation in extension 
program development under a centralized system although not sufficient are even non-
existent now. AEAs remain accountable to their superiors instead of farmers, as it was the 
case prior to 2012. Unequal power relations render farmers unable to demand that 
services of AEAs are readily available. Funding of extension services is now worsened as 
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the DOA relies solely on the central government to finance the delivery of extension 
services. Funds are insufficient and are not released on time. Cumbersome administrative 
processes for the approval of funds, staff attitudes and the inability of government to meet 
the budgetary needs of its departments have accounted for this.  
Since these factors have been adversely affected in a decentralized system, they have in 
turn negatively influenced farmers’ access to extension services. With the exception of 
Kuffuor Camp, where the farmers were relatively satisfied with the availability of 
extension services, the same could not be said of Nkrankrom and Abesim. In Nkrankrom, 
availability of extension services seem to have declined since 2012 while in the case of 
Abesim, the poor access under the centralized system has not improved. Thus it is 
possible to conclude from the results of this study that decentralization has not led to 
improved access to extension services in the Sunyani municipality of Ghana.  
It is however noteworthy, that the failure of decentralization to live up to its promise of 
improved access, at least for now, is not as a result of weaknesses in the concept itself. As 
seen, implementers of decentralization have been unable to rightly mix the ingredients of 
political and organizational factors to ensure success, thereby resulting in a flattened or 
perhaps a sour soufflé. This study also shows that we cannot expect decentralization to be 
a magic wand to address problems of access to service delivery in the Sunyani 
municipality, without meticulously nurturing the factors required for its success. Until 
this is done, the promise of decentralization will remain a mirage. 
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Appendix 1: List of Participants 	  
Government Officials 
 
Participant Gender Organization Date of 
Interview 
Type of Interview 
DOA1 M Department of 
Agriculture 
2014/12/10 
2014/12/11 
2014/12/22 
 
Semi-structured/ 
Focused 
DOA2 M Department of 
Agriculture 
2014/12/11 Semi-
structured/Focused 
DDO1 M Department of 
Agriculture 
2014/12/11 Semi-structured 
DDO2 M Department of 
Agriculture 
2014/12/23 Semi-structured  
MA1 M Sunyani Municipal 
Assembly  
2014/12/16 Semi-structured/ 
Focused 
RD1 M Regional 
Directorate of 
MOFA 
2014/12/16 Semi-structured 
RD2 M Regional 
Directorate of 
MOFA 
2014/12/16 Semi-structured  
AEA1 F Department of 
Agriculture 
2014/12/11 Semi-structured 
AEA2 M Department of 
Agriculture 
2014/12/12 Semi-structured 
AEA3 M Department of 
Agriculture 
2014/12/12 Semi-structured 
AEA4 M Department of 
Agriculture  
2014/12/20 Semi-structured  
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Farmers-Nkrankrom 
 
Participant  Gender Age  Type Date 
Farmer 1 F 36 FGD/Semi-Structured 
Interview 
2014-12-19 
2014-12-20 
Farmer 2 F 37 FGD/Semi-Structured 2014-12-19 
Farmer 3 M 48 Semi-Structured 
Interview 
2014-12-20 
Farmer 4 M 50 Semi Structured 
Interview 
2014-12-19 
Farmer 5 F 36 Semi-Structured 
Interview 
2014-12-19 
Farmer 6 F 42 FGD 2014-12-19 
Farmer 7 M 40 FGD 2014-12-19 
Farmer 8 M 45 FGD 2014-12-19 
Farmer 9 F 42 FGD 2014-12-19 
Farmer 10 F 39 FGD  2014-12-19 
Farmer 11 M 50 FGD 2014-12-19 
Farmer 12 M 51 FGD 2014-12-19 
Farmer 13 F 35 Semi-Structured 
Interview 
2014-12-20 
Farmer 14 M 48 FGD  2014-12-19 
Farmer 15 M 45 FGD 2014-12-19 
 
 
Farmers-Abesim 
 
Participant  Gender  Age Type Date 
Farmer 1 M 49 FGD/Semi-Structured 
Interview 
2014-12-22 
 
Farmer 2 M 45 FGD 2014-12-22 
Farmer 3 M 47 FGD 2014-12-22 
Farmer 4 M 42 FGD 2014-12-22 
Farmer 5 M 50 FGD 2014-12-22 
Farmer 6 M 35 FGD 2014-12-22 
Farmer 7 M 37 FGD 2014-12-22 
Farmer 8 M 38 FGD 2014-12-22 
Farmer 9 F 50 FGD/Semi-Structured 
Interview 
2014-12-22 
Farmer 10 F 51 FGD 2014-12-22 
Farmer 11 F  FGD 2014-12-22 
Farmer 12 M 45 Semi-Structured Interview 2014-12-23 
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Farmers-Kuffuor Camp 
 
Participant Gender Age Type Date 
Farmer 1 M 48 FGD/Semi-Structured 2014-12-22 
Farmer 2 F 44 FGD/Semi-Structured 2014-12-22 
Farmer 3 M 42 FGD 2014-12-22 
Farmer 4 M 50 FGD 2014-12-22 
Farmer 5 M 52 FGD 2014-12-22 
Farmer 6 M 37 FGD 2014-12-22 
Farmer 7 F 35 FGD 2014-12-22 
Farmer 8 F 44 FGD 2014-12-22 
Farmer 9 F 42 FGD 2014-12-22 
Farmer 10 F 50 FGD 2014-12-22 
Farmer 11 M 52 FGD 2014-12-22 
Farmer 12  M 49 FGD 2014-12-22 
Farmer 13 F 32 FGD 2014-12-22 
Farmer 14 F 33 FGD 2014-12-22 
Farmer 15 F 40 Semi-Structured 
Interview 
2014-12-23 
Farmer 16 F 46 Semi-Structured 
Interview 
2014-12-23 
Farmer 17 M 45 Semi-Structured 
Interview 
2014-12-23 
Farmer 18 M 50 Semi-Structured  2014-12-23 
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Appendix 2: Interview Guide for Government Officials 
 
Introduction  
Thanks so much for your willingness to participate in this study. I am Prince a student of 
Lund University in Sweden. This study is being conducted for my masters thesis. I seek 
to understand from you how decentralization has affected or not affected farmers’ access 
to extension services in this municipality. Hence you will be asked a few questions that 
border on the planning and implementation of extension programs before and after 
decentralization. 
 
Your participation in the study is completely voluntary and you may refuse to answer any 
question or choose to stop participating at any time. All information provided will be held 
in confindence and your name will not be mentioned in the report. The interview might 
last for about 45 minutes to an hour, and with your permission, I will like to record the 
session. I will be taking notes as well. Thanks!  
 
Background Information on Participant  
Name: 
Department: 
Position:  
1. When and why was the delivery of agricultural advisory services decentralized? 
2. Generally, would you say these objectives have been met or not? Please explain. 
3. What was the relationship between the Department of Agriculture and the 
Municipal Assembly before decentralization? How has this changed with 
decentralization?  
4. How does the DOA relate to the Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture?  
5. How has decentralization affected or not affected the activities of the Municipal 
Assembly/the Department of Agriculture? 
6. How many staff members does the DOA have? What was the staff strength of the 
DOA before decentralization? 
7. What steps were taken before decentralization to build the capacity of the DOA? 
Have these changed or not with decentralization? 
8. What stakeholders are involved in the planning and delivery of extension services 
in the municipality?   
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9. How did the DOA encourage stakeholder participation in extension services 
delivery before decentralization and how is it done now? 
10. How is the quality and availability of extension services assessed?  
11. How was the DOA funded prior to decentralization? Has this changed now? 
Please explain.  
12. How were farmers reached with extension services before decentralization and 
how are they reached now?  
13. Would you say that extension services are now more readily available to farmers 
than they used to be before decentralization? Please explain.  
Thanks so much!  
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Appendix 3: Interview Guide for Farmers  
 
Introduction 
Thanks so much for your willingness to participate in this study. I am Prince a student of 
Lund University in Sweden. This study is being conducted for my masters thesis. I seek 
to understand from you how decentralization has affected or not affected your access to 
extension services. Hence you will be asked a few questions that border on the planning 
and implementation of extension programs before and after decentralization. 
 
Your participation in the study is completely voluntary and you may refuse to answer any 
question or choose to stop participating at any time. All information provided will be held 
in confindence and your name will not be mentioned in the report. This session might last 
for about an hour, and with your permission, I will like to record the session. I will be 
taking notes as well. Thanks!  
 
Background Information on Participant 
Name:  
Age: 
Gender: 
Crops Cultivated:  
Community: 
1. What kind of agricultural advisory services do you require?  
2. What kind of service was provided to you before decentralization? Has this 
changed with decentralization or not? 
3. How often did you receive advisory services from the DOA before 
decentralization? How is the situation like now? If there are changes, please 
explain why.  
4. How were advisory services delivered to you before decentralization and how are 
they delivered to you now?  
5. Would you say your access to extension services has improved or not over the last 
two years? Please explain.  
6. Would you say the services provided to you before decentralization and now are 
relevant or not to your farming needs? Please explain.  
7. What role did you play in planning the delivery of extension services? Has this 
role changed now? Please explain. 
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8. How do you assess the quality of services you receive from the DOA?  
9. How do you ensure that the DOA renders its services effectively?  
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Appendix 4: Focus-Group Discussion Guide 
 
Introduction  
Thanks so much for your willingness to participate in this study. I am Prince a student of 
Lund University in Sweden. This study is being conducted for my masters thesis. I seek 
to understand from you how decentralization has affected or not affected your access to 
extension services. Hence you will be asked a few questions that border on the planning 
and implementation of extension programs before and after decentralization. 
 
Your participation in the study is completely voluntary and you may refuse to answer any 
question or choose to stop participating at any time. All information provided will be held 
in confindence and your name will not be mentioned in the report. This session might last 
for about an hour, and with your permission, I will like to record the session. I will be 
taking notes as well. Please feel free to express your opinions as much as possible as 
there are no wrong or right answers. Thanks!  
 
Background Information on Participants 
 
Name:  
Age: 
Gender: 
Crops Cultivated:  
Community:  
 
1. What challenges do you usually encounter as farmers? 
2. How does the DOA help you confront these challenges? 
3. How does the DOA provide extension services to you?  
4. Are you satisfied or not with the mechanisms for extension service delivery, both 
prior to and after decentralization?  
5. In the past how did you influence the planning and implementation of extension 
programs?  
6. How did you ensure that the DOA provided its services to you before 
decentralization? Has it changed or not now?  
7. Would you say your access to extension services has improved or not over the last 
two years? Please explain.  
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Appendix 5: Organogram of the Department of Agriculture  
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